Ukraine’s military and Diia job ads still ask for 1C/BAS skills
Job listings from military units, a regional recruitment center and Diia’s finance team show that 1C/BAS skills remain relevant in Ukraine’s back offices. The evidence does not show that the Diia app or weapons systems run on those platforms.
Ukraine has become one of Europe’s most visible examples of public-sector digitalization while fighting a full-scale war. Yet beneath mobile services, defense technology and modern cloud infrastructure sits a less glamorous layer: accounting and enterprise software accumulated over decades. In 2026, job listings show that skills associated with 1C and BAS have not disappeared from that layer.
A March posting from Military Unit A5118 sought an accountant and explicitly listed 1C, 1C Accounting and BAS among the desired skills. The description named 1C/BAS alongside other accounting tools. Military Unit A4640 also sought a head of accounting and reporting with experience in 1C and BAS. A Kyiv regional territorial recruitment and social support center listed familiarity with software such as 1C as an advantage for an accountant.
These postings are meaningful, but they are not a complete software inventory. A hiring requirement proves that an employer considers a skill operationally useful. It does not by itself reveal which version of a product is installed, how many systems use it, what data it processes or whether the organization is already migrating away. The safest conclusion is that legacy ERP knowledge remains relevant inside parts of Ukraine’s defense and government back office.
The most striking example involves Diia, the flagship Ukrainian digital-government brand. A finance and economics vacancy first published on June 25 expected candidates to have a high level of proficiency with 1C, BAS or comparable programs. That sentence can easily produce a misleading headline. It is a finance role, not a mobile engineering job. It is evidence about back-office competency, not proof that the Diia mobile app, web portal or public APIs are built on 1C/BAS.
Diia’s other public job listings make that distinction visible. The organization separately recruits DevOps engineers, mobile specialists, system analysts and security staff for infrastructure, APIs and integrations. A modern citizen-facing product can coexist with an older accounting environment inside the same legal entity. Large corporations and governments around the world often modernize their front ends faster than their internal financial systems.
Ukraine’s legal environment now makes that legacy more consequential. The State Service of Special Communications and Information Protection, or SSSCIP, explicitly addresses 1C and BAS in its guidance on the official list of prohibited software. The agency says their status is tied to the sanctioned rights holder, 1C LLC. It also makes an important distinction: inclusion in the list is a sanctions and legal mechanism, not a technical score proving that every version of a product has a particular vulnerability.
For covered government systems, however, the practical restriction is clear. The rules apply to systems processing state information resources, official data, state secrets and critical information infrastructure. SSSCIP says operating a listed product in an air-gapped or offline environment does not create an exemption. Prohibited components can prevent a system from receiving security authorization or lead to the loss of an existing approval, and inspections can require replacement.
The list itself is expanding quickly. On July 17, SSSCIP said it had grown from 1,079 to 1,341 prohibited software and communications-equipment entries. This turns software provenance into an everyday governance issue. Technology leaders need to know not only what an application does, but who owns it, which components it contains and where it sits in the organization’s data flows.
The reason migration takes time is familiar to any enterprise that has replaced an ERP. Accounting platforms hold years of transactions, payroll rules, tax configurations, inventory balances, vendor records, bespoke reports and integrations. Replacing them is not comparable to installing a new messaging app. Data must be cleaned and converted, business logic recreated, integrations rebuilt, staff trained and financial outputs reconciled before the old system can be retired.
Ukraine is now trying to reduce that cost. On July 28, the IT Ukraine Association and Germany’s federal development agency GIZ announced an additional voucher round to help Ukrainian micro and small businesses replace 1C/BAS with modern ERP systems. The program is significant because it treats migration as an investment problem as well as a security and sanctions problem.
One part of the original claim requires a correction. The supplied material also named Fire Point, a major Ukrainian defense-technology manufacturer. MAIR found Fire Point’s public DOU profile and reviewed indexed vacancies, including engineering and security roles, but did not find independent evidence in those materials that the company uses 1C or BAS. That company-specific allegation therefore remains unverified and should not be stated as fact.
The verified story is strong enough without overreach. Ukraine’s laws and sanctions policy are pushing certain software out of sensitive environments, while hiring data shows that the skills associated with legacy ERP systems remain embedded in some financial workflows. The next stage of digital sovereignty is not a new app. It is the slower work of replacing the systems behind payroll, procurement, accounting and institutional memory without losing the data that keeps organizations running.


